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Building on information-processing perspectives and the Japanese contextual factors, this study investigates
the relationships between ﬁrm strategy and executive bonus pay as well as the moderating role of foreign
ownership on the strategy–compensation relationship in Japanese ﬁrms. We focus on R&D investment and
product diversiﬁcation as strategy variables and investigate their direct effects on executive bonus pay.
Further, we examine the moderating effects of foreign ownership on the strategy–pay sensitivity. The results,
based on a sample of the 148 largest industrial ﬁrms in Japan for the 1990–1997 period, show that both R&D
investment and product diversiﬁcation are positively related to executive bonus pay. Our ﬁndings also
indicate that foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationships between the strategy variables and
executive compensation, suggesting that foreign investors play an active monitoring role, reducing cash
bonus payments when their invested ﬁrms choose to increase R&D or pursue diversiﬁcation strategy.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Executive compensation is considered as one of the most
important mechanisms to align the interests of managers and
shareholders. A large number of studies have examined its determi-
nants and performance effects. The most researched question in this
area has been the link between executive compensation and ﬁrm
performance (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The major ante-
cedents of executive compensation examined so far include corporate
governance factors such as ownership structure, board of directors,
remuneration committee, etc. as well as ﬁrm strategy (Balkin and
Gomez-Majia, 1990; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Firth et al., 2007).
Themajority of these studies have been carried out in the U.S. context.
This may be mostly attributed to the fact that while many U.S. ﬁrms
have been using performance-based executive pay such as stock
options extensively, ﬁrms in other countries have been slow to do so.
Recent years have seen a gradual diffusion of performance-based
compensation to other countries (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and
Tuschke, 2007). However, there has hardly been any empirical
examination of the effects of either corporate governance or ﬁrm
strategy on executive pay in non-U.S. contexts so far. Further, there is
a view that the principal–agent approach that is so widely used in the
U.S. to investigate the determinants of executive compensation may
not be appropriate in international research, because it ignores the
differences in institutional contexts across countries (Buck et al.,
2003; Bruce et al., 2005).
This study attempts to address these gaps in the literature by
investigating the strategic and governance determinants of executive
compensation in the Japanese context. In this study, we examine the
relationship between two important strategic decisions of ﬁrms—R&D
investment and diversiﬁcation—and executive bonus payment. The
speciﬁc impact of executive compensation on R& D and diversiﬁcation
has been attracting increasing attention (Gomez-Mejia, 1992;
Hoskisson et al., 1993). R&D expenses reﬂect a ﬁrm's time orientation
and capacity to bear risk. Diversiﬁcation decisions are fundamental
decisions about the scope of the ﬁrm and represent one of the major
approaches to growth. While R&D expenses capture patterns in
annual resource allocations, diversiﬁcation reﬂects the cumulative
impact of strategic decisions made over a period of time. Further, we
investigate how corporate governance, especially shareholding by
foreign portfolio investors, has any moderating effects on this
relationship, because executive pay reﬂects choices made by owners
of the ﬁrms regarding how their agents should be compensated. Given
the foreign investors’ focus on ﬁnancial returns, we expect their
presence to have a signiﬁcant impact on the relationship between
strategic choices by the ﬁrm and executive pay.
We believe that Japan provides an interesting research context for
a number of reasons. First, Japan's institutional context is character-
ized by the absence of a managerial labor market as well as a market
for corporate control. Second, although there are a limited number of
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studies that have examined the effects of such determinants as ﬁrm
performance (Kaplan, 1994; Kato and Kubo, 2006), keiretsu afﬁliation
(Kato, 1997), and top executive characteristics (Kato and Rockell,
1992) in the Japanese context, there has been virtually no attempt to
examine the effects of ﬁrm strategy and corporate governance on
executive pay in Japan. Our study attempts to address this issue.
2. The empirical context
Traditionally, studies on executive pay have paid little attention to
national differences. Increasingly, however, it is being recognized that
in explaining organizational decisions and actions, institutional
differences may be even more important (Jackson and Deeg, 2008;
Kosaka, 2004). Comparative governance research reveals that corpo-
rate governance practices vary substantially among different institu-
tional contexts (Buhner et al., 1998). Nations also differ signiﬁcantly
in terms of institutional norms and legal traditions that impose
constraints over what ﬁrms can do. Executive compensation practice
is one area that is particularly institutionally embedded (Bruce et al.,
2003). The determination of both the amount and structure of an
executive's compensation is affected by institutional norms, corporate
governance practices, legal restrictions, and the managerial labor
market. This makes the consideration of institutional factors critical to
the study of executive compensation.
2.1. Ownership structure of Japanese ﬁrms
Many Japanese ﬁrms are linked through extensive cross-share-
holding arrangements with their main banks, business partners, and
client ﬁrms. Further, a large portion of Japanese stocks are owned by
“stable” investors (Gerlach, 1992). Stable investors own shares
primarily to cement long-term stable business relationships rather
than to earn a return on their stock investments (Charkham, 1994;
McGuire and Dow, 2002). They own shares in other ﬁrms to ensure
stability in earnings and sales so that they can protect the interests of
important stakeholders including employees, management, and
business partners that are often members of the same keiretsu
group (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Nakatani, 1984). Because of this
“insider” oriented ownership structure, Japanese ﬁrms are able to
make strategic investments for long-term competitiveness (Porter,
1992). Therefore, research on Japanese corporate governance sug-
gests that capital markets or external market investors do not function
as an effective monitoring mechanism to protect and promote the
interests of shareholders who often seek short-term ﬁnancial returns
(Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003).
The ownership structure of Japanese corporations, however, is
beginning to change, primarily due to the increasing role played by
foreign and domestic market investors. Since these investors have only
arm's-length relationships with ﬁrms in which they own shares, they
look for higher investment returns and follow a more shareholder-
oriented corporate governance model (Jackson and Moerke, 2005). In
fact, several studies have found a positive association between foreign
ownership and ﬁrm performance (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005). Foreign
share ownership has also been found to foster appropriate strategic
investment by Japaneseﬁrms (David et al., 2006). Thus, there is growing
evidence to suggest that the stable world of Japanese corporate
governance may be beginning to change as a result of the growing
inﬂuence of foreign portfolio investors.
2.2. Executive compensation in Japanese ﬁrms
Executive compensation of large Japanese ﬁrms usually consists of
regular monthly salary and annual or semi-annual bonus. Executive
salary has been traditionally determined by setting limits to total
salary amount to all directors in the statutes of a corporation or in the
resolution in the shareholders’ meeting, and then the board meeting
approves the exact amount for each executive (Colpan et al., 2007).
Although an increasing number of ﬁrms have begun to adopt
performance-based pay plans in recent years, the salary component
of executive pay was traditionally determined by the rank or seniority
of each manager, and changes in their salaries were often linked to
changes in employee wages (Kubo, 2005).
In contrast to salaries, executive bonus payments in Japan as in
ﬁrms in other countries were more closely tied to performance. The
bonus payment amount of executives’ compensation is typically
between 10 and 30% of their total salary (Kubo, 2005). Executive
bonuses are often reduced or entirely eliminated in the case of poor
ﬁrm performance (Xu, 1997). Until the revision of the Commercial
Code in 1997 which allowed the introduction of stock options to
compensatemanagement and employees, the bonus paymentwas the
major compensation component that was linked to ﬁrm performance.
These contextual factors lead us to focus on executive bonus
payments in Japanese ﬁrms during the period of 1990–1997.
3. Theory and hypotheses
3.1. Strategy and executive compensation
There is an increasing recognition in the literature that ﬁrm
strategy can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on executive compensation
(Balkin and Gomez-Majia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, 1992). The case for a
relationship between ﬁrm strategy and executive compensation can
be made from an information-processing perspective. In the case of
Japan, the precise nature of such a relationship can be derived from an
understanding of institutional characteristics speciﬁc to Japan.
3.1.1. Information-processing perspective
Firm strategy is likely to be one of the key determinants of the level
of executive compensation because different strategies have different
levels of complexity and hence varying levels of demand for
information processing (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Henderson
and Fredrickson, 1996). Since the ability to process complex
information is a valuable resource, managers with such ability are
likely to be paid higher compensation than managers who do not
possess such capabilities. Prior studies show that strategies that
require the CEO to process complex information tend to be associated
with higher CEO compensation (Duru and Reeb, 2002; Henderson and
Fredrickson, 1996).
Greater R&D investment usually leads to high levels of informa-
tion-processing demands on managers for three reasons. First, R&D
investments are typically associated with high levels of outcome
uncertainty or risk. Second, the lead times in many R&D projects are
very long. Third, R&D activity may require high degrees of coordina-
tion among different departments as well as the more complex task of
managing technical staff. Hence, the need to process large amounts of
complex information, outcome uncertainty, long time horizons, and
high overall risk lead to high levels of executive compensation.
Productdiversiﬁcation is another strategy that is likely to increase the
information-processing demands on managers. As diversiﬁcation
increases the scope of the ﬁrm andhence the range of strategic decisions
that managers have to make, managers’ task becomes more complex.
Related diversiﬁcation increases interdependencies among business
units and hence leads to more coordination needs (Henderson and
Fredrickson, 1996). Unrelated diversiﬁcation increases the information-
processing demands for a number of reasons. First, the success of a
conglomerate strategy hinges on themanagement's ability to ensure the
functioning of an efﬁcient internal capital market. Such an internal
capital market would place enormous information-processing needs on
the top management to choose between competing demands by
divisions. Second, monitoring the performance of several unrelated
businesses requiresmore informationprocessing thanmonitoringeither
a single business or related businesses. Third, managing a portfolio of
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unrelated businesses requires entry and exit decisions on a regular basis
which would require the management to scan multiple industry
environments (Jones and Hill, 1988). Hence, greater diversiﬁcation
leads to higher executive compensation (Duru and Reeb, 2002).
3.1.2. Japanese contextual characteristics
Although both the United States and Japan represent capitalist
economies, they practice very different variations of the capitalist
system. While the Anglo-American system is based on equity-based
ﬁnance and dispersed shareholders, the Japanese system relies on
“debt ﬁnancing, concentrated shareholders, and tightly
interconnected networks among ﬁrms, their trading partners, and
ﬁnancial institutions” (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005: 451). Needless
to say, these differences directly lead to differences in the strategic
preferences and resultant resource deployments of Japanese corpora-
tions (Neelankavil and Alaganar, 2003; Porter, 1992).
The considerable success achieved by Japanese corporations in
post-war years is attributable, to a large extent, to sustained
commitment to R&D (Kono, 1984). Commitment to R&D is reﬂective
of both a long-term orientation and a willingness to bear risk. The
ownership structure of Japanese corporations is dominated by
stable investors who are by and large indifferent to short-term
ﬂuctuations in stock price. The stability of stock ownership, in turn,
translates into a time perspective that is signiﬁcantly longer than
time horizons considered by their counterparts in North America
(Porter, 1992). Similarly, life time employment and an unwilling-
ness to change jobs in the pursuit of higher compensation also
contribute to this long-term orientation on the part of Japanese
executives. Considering the longer time perspectives of Japanese
corporations and their willingness to live with the risk inherent in
major R&D commitments, it is to be expected that reward systems
of Japanese corporations would encourage resource allocation
towards greater R&D.
Although the agency approach views product diversiﬁcation as
detrimental to shareholder value, we believe that principals in Japan
have preferences different from those in the U.S. context. Kagono
et al. (1985) found that the diversiﬁcation strategy of Japanese ﬁrms
is characterized by concentration on a few strategic markets, less
active acquisition of new businesses, and greater hesitancy to divest
questionable businesses. While the Anglo-American system empha-
sizes proﬁtability over growth, the Japanese system places emphasis
on growth over proﬁts (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). The
explanation for such a fundamental divergence in the preferences
of Japanese and American ﬁrms lies in the ownership structure of
Japanese corporations. Majority of the stock in Japanese corpora-
tions is held by stable investors who also have other business
relationships with the ﬁrm. These “relationship” investors make
their investments in the ﬁrm not for immediate capital gains but in
order to cement their relationships. Any expansion in the scope or
size of the ﬁrm presents additional opportunities for business for
these relational investors. The potential for relational investors to
appropriate rents from diversiﬁcation has been noted recently by
David et al. (2010). We believe that given the overall preference for
growth as well as the possibility of rent appropriation, relationship
investors in Japan would want their managers to engage in growth
through diversiﬁcation and would be willing to reward them for
engaging in diversiﬁcation.
Finally, from the perspective of Japanese executives, it is
reasonable to assume that they would prefer to receive larger cash
bonus payments, because the salary component of their compensa-
tion is relatively ﬁxed. Hence, other things being equal, those
executives would have preferred to link their bonus payment to
strategic decisions. Thus, based on arguments derived from informa-
tion-processing demands as well as a careful consideration of the
Japanese context, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. R&D investment is positively related to executive bonus
payment.
Hypothesis 2. Diversiﬁcation strategy is positively related to executive
bonus payment.
3.2. Foreign investors, strategy, and executive bonus payment
One of the basic premises of agency theory is that goal
divergence between managers and investors can be resolved
through a mix of monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms,
often inﬂuenced by the interests of large owners. For example, Tosi
and Gomez-Mejia (1989) and Khan et al. (2005) report relation-
ships between ownership concentration and CEO compensation.
David et al. (1998) found that large ownership by institutional
investors was associated with lower CEO pay and stronger long-
term incentives when such investors did not depend on business
with their invested ﬁrms.
The Japanese institutional environment, however, is character-
ized by the presence of “stable” shareholders. These are primarily
domestic owners who own large blocks of shares. As discussed
earlier, their ownership positions are an expression of their
relationship with the ﬁrm. Thus, in the past, the ownership
structure of the ﬁrm had little impact in developing mechanisms
that ensure shareholder value maximization. However, the rising
presence of foreign portfolio investors in the Japanese capital
markets since the 1990s is leading to greater recognition of the
need for shareholder value maximization. Foreign portfolio
investors are predominantly institutional investors from the U.S.,
U.K., or other European countries (Bank of Japan, 2004). Their
primary objective is to maximize the returns on their investment.
Since foreign investors are usually arms-length investors, they do
not beneﬁt from any commercial transactions with their invested
ﬁrms as many domestic ﬁrms do (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005).
They hold shares in Japanese ﬁrms as a part of their global
portfolio to earn higher ﬁnancial returns and also to diversify
investment risk. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that they will
exercise inﬂuence on the ﬁrms in which they invest to pursue
strategies that result in higher returns on their capital (Jackson
and Moerke, 2005). Foreign portfolio investors also tend to trade
shares more frequently than domestic investors, which substan-
tially affect the share price of Japanese ﬁrms. Therefore, although
these investors own a relatively small block of shares, they tend to
have a disproportionate effect on the strategic decisions and
performance of their invested ﬁrms. Past empirical research
indicates foreign ownership inﬂuences a number of ﬁrm outcomes
such as performance (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003), layoffs
(Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001), wages (Yoshikawa et al.,
2005), adoption of global governance codes (Aguilera and
Cuervo-Cazzura, 2004), and level of strategic investments (David
et al., 2006).
Prior to the legalization of stock option compensation in 1997,
executive bonus payments were the only discretionary or variable
part of a Japanese executive's compensation. Salaries tended to
reﬂect seniority and rank rather than performance. Given the
constraints that salaries were more or less ﬁxed and bore very
little relationship to speciﬁc actions or outcomes on the one hand,
and that incentive alignment was not possible through the
granting of stock options on the other hand, cash bonus payments
were the only component of compensation that could be used by
return oriented investors as a lever to induce desirable actions and
reward higher performance.
R&D is considered critical for the long-term competitiveness of a
ﬁrm for a number of reasons. R&D is the source of product innovations
and in the absence of innovations a ﬁrm may suffer competitive
decline. R&D is also the source of process innovations that lead to
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lower costs and higher quality. Given the potential for R&D to result in
higher ﬁrm performance and hence higher stock values, investors
would want to reward managers for undertaking such investments.
Since bonus payments were the only discretionary part of a Japanese
executive's compensation, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 3. Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship
between R&D investment and executive bonus payment.
Most Japanese ﬁrms have pursued diversiﬁcation as a growth
strategy over the past many decades. Both the adherence to life time
employment and the value placed on size and growth are considered to
be the primary motivations for diversiﬁcation by Japanese ﬁrms.
Further, traditionally Japanese ﬁrms have followed a strategy of “retain
and reinvest” rather than “downsize and distribute” (Lazonick and
O'Sullivan, 2002). Domestic relationship investors had preferred a
strategy of “retain and reinvest” because ﬁrm growth offered them
prospects for higher payoffs through various kinds of business relation-
ships. Foreign investors, on the other hand, are unlikely to encourage
diversiﬁcation for a number of reasons. First, a product diversiﬁcation
strategy is more complex to manage. Second, a diversiﬁcation strategy
makes it more difﬁcult for the investors and the board to monitor
because of its complexity due to the wide range of product areas. Third,
managers can use diversiﬁcation strategy to protect managerial
employment (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Finally, empirical research
evidence shows that conglomerate diversiﬁcation actually leads to
reduction in shareholderwealth (Datta et al., 1991). Investors, therefore,
have an incentive to penalize managers who attempt to diversify
excessively by reducing their compensation. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4. Foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationship
between diversiﬁcation strategy and executive bonus payments.
4. Methods
4.1. Sample
The sample was chosen from the 200 largest industrial ﬁrms in sales
in Japan in 1987. The data were collected for the 1990–1997 period.We
chose this period in order to eliminate the effects of stock optionswhich
were legalized in 1997 as a part of compensation. Further, this was a
period of economic decline in Japan. After the stock markets suffered a
sharp drop in late 1989, the Japanese economy experienced stagnation
during the 1990s. This could have an important impact on strategies
such as R&D investment and diversiﬁcation as both entail high risk and
great information demands on managers. We restricted the sample to
publicly traded manufacturing ﬁrms. After removing the privately held
ﬁrms and non-manufacturing ﬁrms, we had a complete unbalanced
panel composed of 691 to 693 observations from 148 ﬁrms.
4.2. Dependent variable
As Japanese ﬁrms are not legally required to disclose the pay of
individual executives, we used the total bonus payments disbursed
to all directors and divided the total amount (in million yen) by
the number of directors. Since the majority of directors of Japanese
ﬁrms are insiders (i.e., corporate executives), we treated the
director bonus as a part of executive compensation. Executive pay
usually includes salary, bonus, director fees, and other perks and
beneﬁts. However, Japanese ﬁrms often adjust executive bonus
payments to ﬁrm performance but not the basic salary (Kubo,
2005). Therefore, we treated the director bonus payments as
performance-linked pay. Previous research (Xu, 1997) has pointed
out the limitations of using average executive salaries: (1) insider
directors of Japanese ﬁrms receive both salaries and bonuses as
employees, executive salaries and bonuses as directors; (2) the
disclosed data include salaries and bonuses paid to outside
directors who earn much less than inside directors. Despite its
limitations, we follow prior studies (Kubo, 2005; Xu, 1997) in
using average executive bonuses as our dependent variable.
4.3. Independent, moderator, and control variables
The independent variables include R&D investment and product
diversiﬁcation as strategic variables and foreign ownership as
governance variable. R&D intensity was calculated as the ratio of
R&D expenditures to total sales. We measured the extent of
diversiﬁcation using a Herﬁndahl index. Data for R&D intensity and
diversiﬁcation were collected from Kaisha Shikiho (Japan Company
Handbook). Foreign ownership was the ratio of shareholdings by
foreign portfolio investors in the total outstanding shares. We
excluded foreign shareholders that are corporate owners because
their investment objectives may be strategic rather than ﬁnancial
returns from their shareholdings. These data were collected from
Nikkei Needs, which contains comprehensive ﬁnancial and other
corporate data on Japanese ﬁrms.
We controlled for performance, calculated as a ﬁrm's relative
return on assets (ROA) as net income expressed as a percentage of
total assets adjusted for the mean ROA of all the ﬁrms in the same
primary industry. Debt can serve as a governance mechanism
because debt reduces a ﬁrm's free cash ﬂow. Therefore, we
controlled for the monitoring effects of debt using a ﬁrm's ratio of
total debt to total assets. We used CEO tenure as a control variable
because long serving CEOs who tend to have more power may try
to delink their bonuses to ﬁrm performance. We also controlled
for share ownership by executives because executive ownership can
narrow the agency problem between shareholders and executives.
Mean of the industry level bonus (industry bonus) is included to
control for the industry effect. We have also included the time
dummy variables to control for the temporal effects. Finally, we
included ownership by ﬁnancial institutions that include banks and
insurance companies, because they may have some inﬂuence on
executive pay as creditors.
4.4. Analysis
The models are estimated by the General Method of Moments
(GMM) implemented in Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel
data. This estimation method has several properties which suit the
characteristics of our sample. First, it allows us to control for
unobserved individual heterogeneity, which could arise, for example,
from differences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment practices. To address this
issue, we model the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity as an
individual effect (ηi) which is thus eliminated by ﬁrst differencing the
variables. All models also included year ﬁxed effects (not reported).
Second, since executive compensation moves slowly to adapt to
corporate strategies and vice-versa, we need to account for the
dynamic partial adjustment of the dependent variable (Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1988; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996). Further-
more, the speciﬁcation of dynamic structures is strongly recom-
mended to avoid possible autocorrelation in the models disturbances.
For these reasons we included the lagged dependent variable as a
regressor.
Third, when calculating ﬁrst differences to remove the ηi
component, it creates a negative correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the errors in the transformed equation and
thus the so-called Within-Group estimation is inconsistent. Even
more, endogeneity is a concern in our analysis since some of our
explanatory variables (mainly those related to the ownership
structure) could be correlated with the error term. Actually, prior
research has emphasized the importance of modeling endogeneity by
using instrumental variables for ownership structure to control for
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possible reverse causality when explaining executive compensation
but also when analyzing its relationship with either diversiﬁcation
(Amihud and Lev, 1999) or R&D intensity (Lee and O'Neill, 2003). To
account for endogeneity, we used lagged values of the regressors as
instruments of the ﬁrst-differenced regressors as proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). The resulting GMM estimator addresses
these endogeneity problems by optimally exploiting these orthogo-
nality conditions. Fourth, GMM estimation provides improved
estimates in the presence of the unknown heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation that often arise in dynamic panels (Arellano, 2003).
Additionally, we centered the values of the explanatory variables
by subtracting the means, to reduce potential multicollinearity in our
tests of the interaction effects (Aiken and West, 1991). We examined
variance inﬂation factors (VIF) to check for multicollinearity and
found that the values were less than 2; well below the cutoff value of
10 that indicates excessive multicollinearity (Green, 2003).
Finally, since this methodology assumes that there is no autocor-
relation in εit, we calculate m1 and m2 statistics for ﬁrst and second
order autocorrelations in the ﬁrst difference residuals for all our
models (see Table 2). Moreover, the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions for the dynamic panel data model was also implemented
to check the validity of the instruments.
5. Results
Table 1 shows the correlations of the variables, and Table 2 shows
the results of the effects of diversiﬁcation, R&D investment, and their
interaction effects with foreign ownership on executive bonus pay.
Table 1 indicates that none of the independent variables is highly
correlated with each other. As shown in Table 2, we found support for
Hypothesis 1. Our results indicate that R&D investment is positively
and signiﬁcantly (p=.005 inModel 2) related to executive bonus pay.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported. We found that diversiﬁcation is
positively and signiﬁcantly (p=.010 in Model 2) related to executive
bonus pay.
We found that the interaction of foreign ownership and R&D
investment is negatively related to executive bonus payments,
where as Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive moderating effect.
However, we found support for Hypothesis 4. Our results show
that the interaction of foreign ownership and product diversiﬁca-
tion is negatively (p=.005 in Model 4) related to executive bonus
payments. These results suggest that foreign investors have
negative impact on executive cash bonus payments when their
invested ﬁrms decide to increase R&D investment or pursue
greater product diversiﬁcation strategy.
Table 1
Correlation matrix.
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Executive bonus 3.73 1.79 1.000
2. Debt/assets .32 .14 −.194 1.000
3. CEO tenure 4.65 4.66 .049 −.167 1.000
4. Director ownership .67 1.64 .034 −.164 .218 1.000
5. Financial ownership 45.29 11.50 −.038 −.061 .048 −.033 1.000
6. Relative ROA .33 1.52 .143 −.235 .213 .178 −.071 1.000
7. Diversiﬁcation .37 .14 -.012 −.052 .070 .079 −.037 .075 1.000
8. R&D 3.49 2.37 .201 −.213 −.040 −.101 .185 −.024 −.186 1.000
9. Foreign ownership 8.39 6.54 .232 −.282 .148 .111 .113 .306 −.042 .264 1.00
Table 2
Results.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Director bonus (lagged) .4118442*** (.0946914) .422377*** (.0982615) .4577061*** (.0982449) .5052803*** (.1018361)
Debt/assets −3.644702*** (1.261199) −3.824079*** (1.272253) −2.713352** (1.304289) −2.544059** (1.318896)
CEO tenure −.0075405 (.0124271) −.0083882 (.012408) −.0076128 (.0123955) −.0086376 (.0125481)
Director own .0489906 (.1306461) .047981 (.1304155) .0729651 (.1304289) .0640427 (.1319702)
Financial own .0225443 (.0168185) .0218402 (.0168662) .0527153*** (.0182581) .0556541*** (.0185617)
ROA relative .123615*** (.0319937) .1250507*** (.0323499) .1123451*** (.0323317) .1198542*** (.0327208)
Industry bonus 1.026839*** (.099721) 0. 9984314*** (.99828) 1.023141*** (.1000009) 1.036168*** (.1011045)
Diversiﬁcation 2.11051* (1.261278) 2.119451* (1.261673) 4.289343** (1.592536)
R&D sales .1805978** (.0833534) .1701773* (.0833606) .3114915*** (.1011341)
Foreign own .0913674*** (.0213479) .2445148*** (.0546904)
Diversiﬁcation* Foreign own −.2486981** (.1012791)
R&D* Foreign own −.0130166** (.0052342)
Constant −1. 674272 (.01083179) −2.840859** (1.124275) −5.78291*** (1.310766) −7.723472*** (1.485479)
Wald 275.62 (13) 282.40 (15) 301.55 (16) 304.24 (18)
m1 −6.51 −6.13 −6.08 −6.03
m2 1.68 1.45 2.03 2.21
Sargan 269.41 (20) 278.64 (20) 263.97 (20) 249.36 (20)
No. of observations 693 691 691 691
(i) ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(ii) Panel data models are estimated by using Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data for Stata.
(iii) Models are estimated after taking ﬁrst differences of the variables so as to eliminate the individual effect, and lags t−1 and t−2 have been used as instruments in order to
control for endogeneity. Time dummies were included in the estimation.
(iv) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses.
(v) Wald is a test of the joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients; it is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no serial correlation. Degrees of freedom in parentheses.
(vi) m1 andm2 are the tests of serial correlation of order 1 and 2, respectively, using residuals in ﬁrst differences. They are asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no
serial correlation.
(vii) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between instruments and error terms. Degrees of
freedom are shown in parentheses.
(viii) Time dummy variables are not reported for space consideration.
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To provide further insights on the moderating effects of foreign
ownership, we created a plot which depicts the interaction
relationships between the strategy variables and directors’ bonus
compensation. In Fig. 1, diversiﬁcation is plotted against director
bonus for both the 20th and the 80th percentile, which represent
low versus high levels of foreign ownership, respectively.
Similarly, Fig. 2 presents the relationship between R&D investment
and executive bonus compensation at the same levels (20th and
80th percentiles). According to both ﬁgures, ﬁrms that are highly
monitored by foreign ownership tend to reduce their bonus
payments when they increase either R&D investment or their
diversiﬁcation level, thus providing evidence on the monitoring
effects of foreign ownership. It corroborates our results in Model 4.
6. Discussion and conclusions
We have examined the direct effects of strategy and the
interaction effects of foreign ownership and strategy on executive
compensation in Japanese ﬁrms. Our focus was on executive bonus
payments, the only component in executive compensation that
reﬂects ﬁrm performance in Japanese ﬁrms prior to the legaliza-
tion of stock options in 1997. We found both R&D investment and
product diversiﬁcation to be signiﬁcant predictors of executive
bonus payments. These results are consistent with our argument
that the Japanese contextual factors reward executives for
choosing strategies for long-term competitiveness and growth.
Thus, despite the lack of active managerial labor market in Japan,
our results indicate that such strategies command a premium in
executive payment.
The results involving the interaction effects of the strategy
variables and foreign ownership support our argument that foreign
portfolio investors play a signiﬁcant monitoring role in the Japanese
context. The results of our study indicate that the presence of foreign
investors results in lower bonuses for executives undertaking
diversiﬁcation. The information-processing perspective would sug-
gest that increasing diversiﬁcation would lead to higher rewards for
executives because of the higher information-processing needs. The
empirical results, however, suggest that foreign investors prefer that
their invested ﬁrms do not engage in diversiﬁcation.
We had hypothesized that foreign ownership would have a
positive moderating effect on the relationship between R&D
investment and executive bonus payments. Surprisingly, the results
of our study are contrary to our expectation. One possible
theoretical explanation for this result may involve the appropriate-
ness of bonus payments as a reward for R&D investments.
Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) argue that since R&D is a
long-term investment, often taking up to ten years before outcomes
can be known and beneﬁts are realized, short-term cash bonus is
not an appropriate way to compensate executives. Further, R&D
investments, because of their highly technical nature, are more
difﬁcult for outsiders such as investors to assess, because they often
do not possess technological knowledge and expertise to do so.
Therefore, investors are unlikely to encourage short-term cash
bonus payments in such situations. In other words, our results do
not warrant an interpretation that foreign investors are myopic
with regard to R&D investments. Instead, they may have reserva-
tions about using short-term cash bonus payments as a means to
bring about incentive alignment with regard to R&D investments
that are informationally complex, long term in terms of time
horizon, and of uncertain outcomes. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with the agency theory argument that return-oriented investors
narrow the agency problem by reducing short-term cash bonuses
when executives engage in strategies with longer term payoffs.
One of the contributions of our study is that our results provide
supporting evidence for the applicability of the information-processing
perspective to the strategy–pay relationship in the Japanese context.
When Japanese executives chose to increase R&D investment or engage
in diversiﬁcation strategy, their bonus payment also increased during
the period from 1990 to 1997. This suggests that heavy cognitive
demands on executives were compensated through larger bonus
payment. This is an interesting result, because external labor market
for senior executives is not as developed in Japan as in the U.S. and also
because Japanese ﬁrms tend to emphasize ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills and
experience. Our results imply that even in such a context, managerial
human capital is valued and compensated through bonus payments.
Further, our ﬁndings suggest that the Japanese context not only
encourages executives to choose long-term and growth oriented
strategies, but also rewards those executives. Many studies often treat
Japanese managers as one stakeholder group that balances the
interests of various stakeholders such as employees and business
partners (Aoki, 1988), and do not pay much attention to managerial
motives. Our study shows that Japanese ﬁrms reward those managers
that choose such strategies that are consistent with their long-term
and stakeholder-oriented values.
While interpreting the results of this study, it is important to bear in
mind some of its limitations. First, we have focused on only the 1990–
Fig. 1. Executive compensation and diversiﬁcation and the moderating effect of foreign
ownership. Fig. 1 plots the level of diversiﬁcation (x-axis) on cash bonus payment (y-axis).
“High F.O.” and “Low F.O.” respectively represent ﬁrms at the 20th and 80th percentiles of
foreign ownership. The remaining variables inModel 4 were held constant at their means.
Fig. 2. Executive compensation and R&D expenditure and the moderating effect of foreign
ownership. Fig. 2 plots R&D investment (x-axis) on cash bonus payment (y-axis). “High F.O.”
and “Low F.O.” respectively represent ﬁrms at the 20th and 80th percentiles of foreign
ownership. The remaining variables in Model 4 were held constant at their means.
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1997 period because our study was designed to eliminate the effects of
stock options. However, some Japanese ﬁrms have been moving away
fromcompensation schemes that traditionally rely on seniority and rank
and have started offering stock options to their executives and
employees. Hence, future studies need to examine the relationship in
subsequent periods to understand the changes that may have taken
place in the relationship between performance and executive compen-
sation, possibly including stock options. Second, we used only R&D
investment and product diversiﬁcation as our strategy variables. We
need to investigate the relationship between other strategic invest-
ments and executive compensation to seewhether there are differences
between them in terms of the strategy–pay sensitivity. Finally, research
on executive compensation in other national contexts is still relatively
limited. Given the paucity of research on compensation systems and
their performance implications in non-U.S. contexts, it is imperative that
future studies examine these relationships in differing national contexts
and across different time periods.
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